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AMERICAN ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED TO
EUROPEAN COMMISSION V. INTEL
Paul Jones*1
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2009, the European Commission found that the Intel
Corporation (“Intel”) had abused its dominant position in the market for
central processing units by unlawfully excluding competitors from the
marketplace.2 As a result of the Commission’s findings, Intel was fined
1.06 billion Euros;3 equivalent to 1.45 billion U.S. dollars, the largest
fine ever levied by the Commission for breach of the European Union’s
competition laws.4 The Commission’s decision was based on Article 82
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“Article 82”),
which holds that a firm may not abuse its dominant position in a way that
affects trade among its member states.5
Jurisprudence regarding this type of dominant firm behavior reflects
an economic and legal dilemma faced by governments around the world
concerning the regulation of large firms in the marketplace.6 The
dilemma exists because antitrust law is charged with reigning in
unchallenged economic powers, which deaden competition and harm
consumers, while allowing successful firms to enjoy victory in fair
competition.7 Governments develop antitrust jurisprudence in order to
regulate the market amidst this dilemma. A worldwide firm, such as
Intel, operates among many governments, all of which have developed
separate antitrust jurisprudence reflecting different standards and values
in the regulation of markets. Analyzing the European Commission’s
recent investigation and findings of Intel’s business practices under
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American jurisprudence provides a useful comparison between European
and American antitrust law.
The scope of this paper is to identify the conduct for which Intel was
found in violation of the European Union’s competition laws and analyze
the exact same conduct under the competition and antitrust laws of the
United States. Section II is an introduction to the global market in which
Intel competes. Section III discusses the European Commission’s case
against Intel, including a pointed description of Intel’s unlawful conduct.
Section IV provides an analysis of Intel’s European business practice, as
described by the European Commission, analyzed under United States
competition and antitrust jurisprudence. The last section discusses the
standard that would likely be applied to Intel in a similar case heard in
the United States.
II. THE WORLD-WIDE CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT MARKET
The central processing unit (“CPU”), also known as microprocessor
or processor, is considered the brains of a computer. The CPU loads the
operating system and basically all computer operations run through the
CPU.8 CPU producers generally sell CPUs to Original Equipment
Manufacturers (“OEMs”) such as Dell, Hewlett Packard and Lenovo,
which assemble computers using CPUs along with myriad hardware and
software components purchased from many different producers.9 After
assembly, the OEMs sell finished computers to both consumers and
retailers.10
The global market for producing and selling CPUs is dominated by
Intel. Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”) is the only other firm
considered to be a major player in the industry. Nonetheless, Intel
maintains nearly an 80% market share,11 while the two companies
compete for the sale of practically every CPU throughout the world.12
Over time, AMD has filed numerous antitrust complaints against Intel,
which has spurred regulators in a number of countries to take a hard look
8
Encyclopedia
Britannica,
Central
Processing
Unit
Definition,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102611/central-processing-unit (last visited Feb. 12,
2011).
9
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing,
http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs010.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
10
Merriam Webster, OEM Definition, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oem (last
visited Feb. 12, 2011).
11
IDC – Press Release, Worldwide PC Microprocessor Unit Shipments Rise 31.3% Year Over
Year
in
the
Fourth
Quarter,
According
to
IDC,
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS22178710 (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
12
In 2009, Intel captured 79.7% of the microprocessor market while AMD had a market share
of 20.1%; VIA Technologies had a negligible share of the market. See id.
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at the way Intel competes for business.13 AMD has long felt that Intel has
used its dominant position in the processor market to exert
anticompetitive pressure on OEMs, placing artificial limits on AMD’s
capacity to compete for CPU sales. AMD’s allegations are not without
merit, as seen by the European Commission’s investigation of Intel,
which centered on Intel’s business practices in the market for CPUs that
were part of the “x86 family” of microprocessors.14 Today, most
desktops, notebooks, and servers throughout the world utilize the x86
family of processors.
III. EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S FINDINGS: INTEL’S ABUSE OF A
DOMINANT POSITION
The European Commission’s three-year investigation of Intel’s
potentially anticompetitive business practices found that Intel had
engaged in two different types of anticompetitive behavior that violated
the European Union’s competition laws: (1) conditional rebates and (2)
naked restraints, or pay-for-delay agreements. The anticompetitive
conduct stems from Intel’s business dealings with a number of OEMs—
Dell, Hewlett Packard, NEC, and Lenovo—as well as two European
electronics and computer retailers—Media Markt and Saturn. Media
Markt and Saturn are both owned and operated by a single parent
company, Media Saturn Holding (“MSH”).15 The following details the
Commission’s findings:
A. Conditional Rebates and Payments
According to the Commission’s findings, Intel’s business model
included the practice of offering OEMs rebates on the condition that the
OEMs agreed to buy all or nearly all of their x86 CPUs from Intel.16 Intel
made payments to MSH, the European computer retailer, conditioned on
the retailer exclusively selling computers that utilized the Intel x86
CPU.17 These exclusivity agreements, known as conditional rebates,
reduced the OEM’s freedom to choose from whom to purchase their x86
CPUs and harmed end-user consumers by limiting their choice of the
brand of CPUs integrated in the computers in the marketplace. The
ultimate effect of the rebates was that they strong-armed OEMs, forced
13
Intel News Release, AMD and Intel Announce Settlement of All Antitrust and IP Disputes,
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/2009/20091112corp_a.htm (Nov. 12, 2009) (last
visited Feb. 12, 2011).
14
Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 279.
15
Id. at 53.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 279.
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loyalty to Intel, and distorted competition in the marketplace for x86
CPUs, resulting in the CPU market being affected by factors inconsistent
with fair competition.
The Commission conducted a thorough investigation of Intel’s
business relationships with the major OEMs, as well as the European
retailer, MSH. The findings revealed that Intel offered conditional
rebates and payments that severely limited the amount of business the
OEMs could conduct with non-Intel CPU producers, specifically AMD.18
1) Dell
The Commission found that Dell was exclusively incorporating Intel
processors into its computers specifically in order to qualify for Intel’s
conditional rebates.19 At one point, Dell evaluated the possibility of
adding a line of AMD-based computers,20 but concluded that entering
into an agreement with AMD would have an overall negative financial
impact because Intel would discontinue or reduce the amount of rebates
it offered.21 Intel never informed Dell of the exact amount by which the
rebate would be reduced22; that uncertainness likely posed too great a
risk for Dell to add the AMD-based line. With no written agreement
regarding the rebate, Dell was apprehensive about dual sourcing with
AMD. Thus, the rebate became a source of control for Intel and ensured
that Dell would not stray from its exclusivity agreement.
2) Hewlett Packard
Much like Dell, Hewlett Packard (“HP”) was required to purchase a
significant percentage of their supply of processors from Intel in order to
qualify for a rebate. Although HP was not required to purchase
exclusively from Intel, it was nonetheless required to purchase 95% of its
processors from Intel to qualify for the rebate.23 HP was the first major
OEM to offer an AMD-based business desktop, and it had plans to
produce and ship a large volume of them. Ultimately however, it shipped
only a limited number; the AMD-based units ended up accounting for
less than five percent of HP’s x86 product offering. HP confirmed that
Intel’s rebate was a major factor in its decision to scale down its AMDbased desktop computer plans.
18

Kanter, supra note 4.
Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 280.
20
Id. at 280–81.
21
Id. at 281.
22
Id. at 284.
23
Id. at 287.
19
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Worth mentioning is the fact that AMD was so interested in placing
its processors in HP’s computers that it offered HP one million free
processors.24 It is reasonable to assume that a company, unrestrained by
anticompetitive forces, would gladly and quickly accept such an offer;
however, HP only accepted a small fraction of the free processors.25 The
decision to accept only a fraction of the CPUs, an essential and
expensive element in HP’s product, makes little sense in a competitive,
free market. Intel’s rebates undoubtedly influenced HP’s decision.
3) NEC
NEC’s rebate, much like Dell’s and HP’s, was conditional on NEC
purchasing at least 80% of its x86 processors from Intel.26
4) Lenovo
Lenovo planned to roll out an AMD-based notebook in 2007, but
canceled it before the project got off the ground. According to an email
circulated within the company, Lenovo “cut a lucrative deal with Intel”
and thus would “not be introducing AMD based products in 2007.”27
Lenovo then became an exclusive buyer of Intel CPUs and dropped its
plans with AMD.28
This result is particularly interesting when viewed in light of
Lenovo’s perception of AMD. Correspondences between Lenovo
executives show that Lenovo was very interested in implementing AMD
CPUs into its systems. The executives asserted that “AMD has the
highest penetration in the market Lenovo is targeting for growth” and
“AMD CPU prices are significantly below Intel.”29 Lenovo’s
cancellation of its plans regarding AMD-based notebooks strongly
suggests that the agreement Lenovo entered into with Intel was, in effect,
a conditional rebate. Otherwise, Lenovo would have likely rolled out an
AMD-based notebook in light of the fact that Lenovo’s executives were
aware that AMD’s CPUs were less expensive than Intel and that there
was a market demand for AMD-based notebooks.
5) Media Saturn Holding

24

Id. at 288–89.
Id. HP accepted only 160,000 processors. Id.
26
Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 293.
27
Id. at 161–62 (quoting Lenovo submission pursuant to EU investigation).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 296 (quoting Lenovo submission pursuant to EU investigation) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
25
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Media Saturn Holding ("MSH") is a German-based consumer
electronics retailer which operates in fourteen European countries.30
MSH is the largest personal computer retailer in Europe.31 Intel
contracted with MSH to offer certain rebate payments in exchange for
MSH's promise to exclusively offer Intel-based computer systems.32 The
two companies continued a conditional rebate relationship in various
forms for nearly ten years prior to the Commission’s investigation.33
MSH actually viewed certain AMD-based products to be attractive
substitutes for similar Intel products and was seriously interested in
selling AMD-based computer systems. On a number of occasions, MSH
entered into negotiations with AMD regarding the viability of carrying
AMD products. The negotiations never materialized because the
conditional rebate payments offered by Intel were always more
lucrative.34 Thus, the result was the same as with the OEMs—Intel’s
conditional rebates restricted MSH’s freedom to choose between CPU
manufactures and limited what it could offer its customers.
As evidenced by its agreements with Dell, HP, NEC, Lenovo, and
MSH, Intel offered substantial economic benefits in exchange for
promises of fidelity. The OEMs became captive and were strapped with
golden handcuffs once they accepted the rebates. The exclusivity
agreements forced the OEMs to forego business opportunities and
ventures they would have otherwise pursued.
B. European Jurisprudence of Conditional Rebates
Markets that are dominated by a single firm are subject to the
regulations found in Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community. Article 82 prohibits firms with a dominant position from
abusing their position in a way that negatively impacts competition.35
Article 82 is enforced by the European Commission,36 which has held
that Article 82 is a tool to objectively analyze whether the dominant firm
has engaged in “methods different from those which condition normal
competition in products and services,” and result in a weakening of
competition or stifling the growth of competition in the market.37 The
30

Id. at 176.
Id.
32
Id. at 298.
33
Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 176.
34
Id. at 293.
35
See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 82.
36
Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 13.
37
Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. ¶ 91; accord Case C-95/04, British
Airways v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 66.
31
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European Union’s Court of Justice, the highest court in the Union, has
also consistently held that a dominant firm illegally abuses its position,
per Article 82, if it obligates a purchaser to acquire all or most of their
requirement exclusively from the dominant firm, even when the
obligation “is undertaken in consideration of the grant of a rebate” or
within “a system of fidelity rebates.”38 Conditional rebates are
“incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition within the
common market.”39
The Court's inquiry is focused on the conduct of the dominant firm in
the industry and the exclusionary intent of the agreements.40 The analysis
does not consider the effect of the agreement on other market
participants.41 Thus, a dominant firm can be found to have abused its
position regardless of whether its competitors suffered or were likely to
have suffered foreclosure or other adverse effects. Furthermore, under
Article 82, it does not matter if the other competitors in the market
experienced setbacks or, even in the unlikely scenario, greater success
during the time the conditional rebates were in place.42
C. Pay-for-Delay, Naked Restraints
On a more limited scale, Intel was found to have violated Article 82
by engaging in naked restraints; requiring OEMs through contractual
provisions to delay the release of certain AMD products (“pay-fordelay”).43 Even though Intel engaged in pay-for-delay agreements on a
more limited scale than the conditional rebates, the pay-for-delay
agreements are perhaps more egregious because, unlike conditional
rebates, which could arguably lead to efficiency enhancements such as
more dedicated support and service for Intel products by the OEM or
retailer, pay-for-delay agreements lack any redeeming efficiency or procompetitive justification.44 The only outcome of pay-for-delay
agreements is that the supplier, Intel in this case, is benefited by the time
the competing products are not offered in the marketplace. When the
supplier is a dominant firm, like Intel, their dominance is further
entrenched. End users are ultimately harmed because there is less
competition and these effects usually last much longer than the agreed
upon delay period.
38

Hoffman-La Roche, Case 85/76, ¶ 89.
Id. at ¶ 90.
40
Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 277–78.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 472
44
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements:
Agreements
Designed
to
Advance
Innovation
and
Commercialize
Technology,
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/jorde2.shtm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
39
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1) Hewlett Packard
The agreement between Intel and HP included terms whereby HP
had to limit and postpone its distribution of AMD-based business
desktops.45 Specifically, the agreement restricted HP from selling AMDbased desktops to mainstream business customers, and AMD products
could only be purchased directly from HP rather than from HP’s
downstream business partners.46 Furthermore, HP had to agree to delay
the launch of the AMD computers in certain large markets for six
months.47 Naturally, these limits were injurious to AMD because its
market reach via HP was delayed and relegated to nonmainstream
business. By extension, the limits were injurious to end-user consumers
because consumers in mainstream business were unable to purchase
AMD-based HP computers. In effect, Intel had completely blocked that
distribution channel.
2) Acer
Acer had planned to launch both an AMD desktop and notebook in
September 2003. It delayed the launch until January 2004 in some
markets and May 2004 in others.48 Acer’s decision to delay the launch
was induced by pressure from Intel executives, which prompted Acer to
feel that Intel funding would be decreased if it did not delay the launch as
Intel desired.49
3) Lenovo
Lenovo entered into an agreement with AMD to launch two
notebooks in 2006; the first wave of geographic markets in June and the
other markets in September or October.50 Negotiations regarding funding
from Intel induced Lenovo to postpone the first wave to coincide with
the second wave to take place in September or October.51 Then the
launch was postponed until 2007.52 Ultimately, due to financial pressure
Intel exerted upon Lenovo, the launch was canceled entirely.53

45

Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 474–76.
Id. at 474-75.
47
Id. at 475.
48
Id. at 477.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 477-78.
51
Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 478.
52
Id.
53
Id.
46
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D. European Jurisprudence of Pay-for-Delay, Naked Restraints
Article 82 is upheld as an objective, results-oriented standard
applicable to the full spectrum of anticompetitive conduct by a dominant
firm. European Commission case law constructs an analysis void of
inspection of the smaller firm’s performance during the agreement
period.54 Proper analysis of Intel’s conduct leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the pay-for-delay agreements caused delays and
restrictions on the commercialization of AMD-based products, which in
turn had a negative effect on competition among member states in
violation of Article 82.
IV. INTEL’S CONDUCT ANALYZED UNDER AMERICAN
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
Intel’s conduct in Europe may be unique to its operations in the
European Union, or it may provide a window into the type of general
business practices Intel is engaged in around the globe. If Intel had made
the same arrangements with OEMs and retailers in the United States, its
actions would be evaluated according to American antitrust
jurisprudence.
A. United States Antitrust Standards
In the United States, unilateral conduct by dominant firms is
regulated by Section Two of the Sherman Act (“§2”).55 Under §2, firms
are forbidden from taking steps to create or maintain a monopoly.56 The
language of the Sherman Act is often much stricter than its application,
as case law has fleshed out the unacceptable unilateral conduct that tends
to create or maintain a monopoly. Section 2 is composed of three
different offenses by which a defendant can be brought in violation:
monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and conspiring to monopolize
(conspiring is seldom alleged). The Clayton Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and the Robison-Putnam Act also play a role in which
competition among firms is regulated in the United States.
1) Monopolization
To violate the monopolization standard of §2, the defendant must
have monopoly power in the relevant market and must have acquired or
maintained that power anti-competitively, as distinguished from natural
54

Id. at 479.
15 U.S.C. §2 (2010).
56
Id.
55
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growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.57 Thus, not all monopolies are unlawful.
The first step in a monopolization case is to determine if the defendant
has monopoly power. Market share is an often-used method to determine
market power; however, the question of how much market share is
needed to make an inference of monopoly power is still unclear. Case
law has established that a 90% share of the market is enough, while 41%
is not.58 Judge Learned Hand offered further guidance by saying that “it
is doubtful whether sixty . . . percent would be enough” to establish
monopoly power.59
A recent development in determining monopoly power is the
implementation of the cross elasticity of demand test, which courts have
begun to use to determine the relevant market and market power.60 Cross
elasticity of demand is an economic tool for measuring consumer
response when a firm raises prices. If consumers can easily substitute
another product in response to the raised price, then the product market
will need to be expanded to include the product that consumers
purchased after the price increase.61 Since the relevant market was
expanded to include the second product, the first producer will have a
high cross elasticity of demand; market share will decrease and with it
the likelihood of a finding of monopoly power. Inversely, if a producer is
able to raise prices and consumers are unable to find close substitutes in
response to the price increase, there is low elasticity and the market can
be narrowly defined. Thus, if the producer is a dominant player in the
market, there is an increased chance it will be found to have monopoly
power.
Once monopoly power is established, the second prong of illegal
monopolization needs to be proven: acquisition or maintenance of the

57
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). This framework is still in
effect today, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
58
Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and Aluminum Company of America had 90% share of the
market and were deemed to have monopoly power. U.S. Steel’s 41% was insufficient to determine
monopoly power as was Standard Oil of Indiana’s 26%.
59
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
60
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The Court defined the
appropriate market for flexible wrapping materials as compared to a market for the Du Pont-made
cellophane. Definition of the market is critical to any monopoly analysis and is often the crux of the
monopoly power issue. Since the relevant market was defined broadly, du Pont was found to have
relatively less market share and no monopoly power. Id. Other econometric measurement may not
literally decrease market share and yet reveal that the company’s hold on market share is not as
strong as it appears and questions monopoly power even in light of a high percentage of market
share. GAVIL, supra note 6.
61
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2004).
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monopoly via improper, anticompetitive, exclusionary conduct.62
Examples of improper conduct include artificial and anticompetitive
barriers to entry, certain types of systematic price discrimination, tying
arrangements, market leveraging, predatory pricing, price squeezing as
wholesaler and retailer, refusal to deal, and other exclusionary and
anticompetitive conduct.63
2) Attempt To Monopolize
To satisfy an attempt to monopolize claim, the defendant must have
“(1) engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct, with (2) a specific
intent to monopolize, and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power.”64 The type of anticompetitive conduct in attempt to
monopolize claims largely mirrors the type of conduct prohibited by
monopolization claims. Intent is a major factor because the harm that the
monopolization claim protects against has not occurred yet; but if intent
is present it allows the government and private litigants an avenue of
relief while the potentially monopolistic behavior is in its incipiency.
Requiring proof of the probability of achieving monopoly power is
essential to the attempt claim.
If exclusionary conduct, even
accompanied by malicious intent, is not likely to lead to monopoly
power, consumers are not at risk of suffering from the type of control
monopolists are able to exert, and consequently, no violation exists.65
B. American Antitrust Standards Applied to Intel’s Conduct
If Intel had entered into conditional rebates and pay-for-delay naked
restraints in the United States, it could be sued by a competitor such as
AMD or one of the United States government agencies charged with
enforcing American antitrust and competition laws—the Federal Trade
Commission’s Bureau of Competition or the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice. Regardless of who brings the suit, the case would
be tried on the foundation of United State statutes, namely Section Two
of the Sherman Act and the cases that have established American
competition and antitrust jurisprudence. The remainder of this section
will analyze Intel’s conduct of entering into conditional rebates and payfor-delay agreements under the framework of American antitrust
jurisprudence.
1) Conditional Rebates
62

GAVIL, supra note 6, at 593.
SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 649–706.
64
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
65
Id.; see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993).
63

62

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 7

If Intel had entered into conditional rebate arrangements with OEMs
in the United States, similar to its arrangements with the OEMs in
Europe, a finding of anticompetitive conduct would not be as certain
under United States antitrust laws as it was with the European
Commission’s decision. Even though the conduct of offering rebates on
the basis of exclusivity appear to create or maintain a monopoly on its
face, United States case law has established that only a subset of
exclusionary rebates are anticompetitive.
A rebate similar to that of Intel’s was at issue in Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson, where the United States Supreme Court held
that under the Robinson-Putnam Act, which makes certain price
discrimination practices unlawful, the injury is of the same general
character as that “inflicted by predatory pricing schemes actionable
under §2.”66 In other words, because the rebates actually decrease the
price paid for the product(s), the offering of conditional rebates is
analyzed under the framework of predatory pricing, which focuses on the
price charged for the product in relation to the cost to produce that same
product.67 While lowering prices can be a way firms compete, it can also
be a means of anticompetitive predation. The Supreme Court has
cautioned: “The costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high. [T]he
mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering
prices—is often the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates
competition; because cutting prices in order to increase business often is
the very essence of competition” and that “mistaken inferences . . . are
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect.”68
Brooke Group established a two-pronged test for determining when a
company has “priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to
eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control
over prices in the relevant market.”69 The first prong, known as the
below cost requirement, requires the plaintiff to prove that its rival has
set its prices “below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.”70 The
second prong, the recoupment cost, is a determination as to whether the
rival has a “dangerous probability[] of recouping its investment in below
cost pricing.”71
66

Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221.
Id.
68
Id. at 226 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 122 n.17 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
69
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 224
67
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The first prong tends to show the predatory nature of the conduct.
Firms that compete on the merits are not able to consistently price their
products below the costs they incur to produce the products; otherwise,
they would not be able remain a going concern. Predators, firms who
price below cost, are altering the playing field such that other firms
cannot be expected to compete and will eventually be forced out of the
market. This results in the predator having increased market share and
possibly gaining monopoly power. Predatory firms view the first phase
of a predatory pricing scheme as an investment because it will likely lose
money during the predatory pricing campaign by selling below cost, but
after competing firms exit the market, the predator enters the second
phase of the predatory pricing scheme. In the second phase, the firm
charges monopoly, or supra-competitive, prices for the product in a
market where it has gained greater market share and control. Consumers
are harmed because of the price increases, and the predator can replay
the strategy if it is threatened by a market entrant, further entrenching
itself as a monopolist to the detriment of the consuming society.
It is important to emphasize that a low price alone is not enough to
trigger antitrust liability. Low prices may be the result of a predatory
pricing scheme, but they may also result from a number of efficiency
based reasons, such as innovation, streamlined distribution, or improved
contracts with suppliers. When low prices result from better run
businesses, consumers benefit and the firm should not be subject to
antitrust liability.
The second prong from Brooke Group, which is much more difficult
to establish than the first, is intended to force the plaintiff to prove
antitrust injury72 and show that not only was it harmed, but the
consuming public was harmed or at risk of being harmed by the rival’s
pricing scheme. Naturally, if a plaintiff is only able to establish below
cost pricing and nothing more, the consumers are benefited because
prices have been decreased and consumers are not in danger of being
subject to supra-competitive prices; hence, there is no reason to
reprimand or punish the rival. However, if a plaintiff can establish that a
rival is capable of charging monopoly prices, after it and other
competitors are forced out of the market because of the below cost
pricing of a rival, then the courts take issue with the conduct as the
practice will likely harm consumers in the long run.
Brooke Group involved the oligopolistic cigarette market which was
not dominated by a single-firm monopolist.73 Although there were just a
72

Antitrust injury is generally required of all antitrust plaintiffs. A plaintiff needs to establish
that they have sustained an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent or remedy.
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Matic, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
73
There were six major cigarette manufacturers in the industry.

64

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 7

few firms in the industry, it was still a very competitive market; the
defendant in Brooke Group had only a 12% market share.74 This is in
stark contrast to the near 80% market share Intel enjoyed in the CPU
market. While Brooke Group was decided by the United States Supreme
Court and has become the standard for conditional rebate cases, the Intel
and AMD relationship more closely parallels a Third Circuit decision—
Le Page’s v. 3M, which involved a monopolistic market.
In Le Page’s, the producer of Scotch brand tape, 3M, held a 90%
share of the transparent tape market.75 LePage’s, a competitor, filed suit
against 3M under §2 monopolization and attempted monopolization
claims.76 LePage’s charged 3M with bundling rebates and entering into
exclusivity contracts, and the Third Circuit explicitly denied 3M’s
Brooke Group defense.77 3M admitted that it was a monopolist and that it
entered into exclusivity agreements, but argued that it did not violate the
law because it “never priced its transparent tape below its cost,”
apparently in complete reliance on Brooke Group.78 Based largely on
market structure, the Third Circuit held that “a monopolist is not free to
take certain actions that a company in a competitive (or even
oligopolistic) market may take, because there is no market constraint on
a monopolist’s behavior.”79 The parenthetical appears to be a direct
response to 3M’s Brooke Group defense because Brooke Group
concerned the oligopolistic cigarette market, and 3M was a monopolist in
a market for transparent tape.
3M based its defense on the first prong of the Brooke Group test—
below cost pricing. The court, however, discounted the first prong for
application in the monopolistic market and focused on the second
prong—recoupment of losses after the period of discount pricing.80 3M
conceded that it could recoup the lost profits it incurred during the time it
instituted its pricing strategy81 apparently under the belief that it was
safeguarded by the below-cost pricing element of Brooke Group.
However, because competition in an oligopoly makes it more difficult to
recoup discounted pricing, the below cost requirement is a sufficient
standard for courts to establish the predatory, exclusionary requirement
of §2 in oligopolies. In a monopoly, however, it is easier to recoup the
74
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investment in discounted pricing—if the monopolist successfully
eliminates competition by using a discount-pricing strategy, it can then
increase prices by the use of its monopoly power. To prevent this type of
harm, the first prong of Brooke Group is appropriately lowered in
monopoly markets, as was the case in LePage’s.
To summarize, the lower LePage’s standard holds that a monopolist
violates §2 when it competes on any basis other than the merits,
regardless of above–or below–cost pricing. Because a monopolist can
easily charge supra-competitive prices and recoup lost profits from its
discount-pricing scheme by raising prices once competitors are forced
out of business, the hurdle of anticompetitive, exclusionary conduct is
rightfully lowered. However, when dealing with an oligopoly, like in
Brooke Group, the higher hurdle may be necessary.
The result is that Brooke Group is very friendly to defendants
because it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the defendant
is able to recoup its investment in below cost pricing.82 As such, Intel
would be in a better position to defend its conduct under the Brooke
Group standard than the LePage’s standard. If Brooke Group were
applied, the plaintiff would need to establish that Intel sold its processors
at a price that was less than the cost to produce them, after taking into
consideration the value of the rebates Intel offered to its OEM customers.
Unfortunately, the European Commission’s case does not provide
enough facts to establish that Intel met the first prong of Brooke Group
because below-cost-pricing is not a factor under Article 82. If Intel can
show that it sold the CPUs for a price that was at all higher than its costs
to produce them, it will prevail in an antitrust suit if Brooke Group is the
standard. If the first prong of Brooke Group is satisfied and Intel is
shown to have sold its CPUs for prices lower than its cost to produce
them, the analysis would proceed to the second prong.
Proving the second prong—showing that the predator is able to
recoup its investment in below-cost pricing—is often where plaintiffs
struggle to prove their case. With the case of Intel however, proving the
second prong would be rather straightforward. If AMD, the only real
threat to Intel’s chokehold on the CPU global market, were to exit the
industry, Intel would not only have monopoly power, but it would
practically be the only participant in the market. Intel would be free to
raise prices for their CPUs because there would be no other viable
82
Some schools of thought hold that it is extremely rare, almost to the point of impossible, to
profitably engage in predatory pricing because recoupment is or nearly is impossible – there would
need to be a market with insurmountable barriers to entry to make recoupment profitable. SULLIVAN,
supra note 61. The court in Matsushita claimed that the cartel would need to charge supracompetitive prices for 30 years in order to recoup their supposed investment in predatory pricing and
the barriers to entry in the television market were not so great as to keep competitors from entering
the market amid monopoly pricing.
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options for OEMs. Any competitor vying for a position in the market
would have to overcome significant barriers to entry,83 and Intel would
have a considerable amount of time as the sole producer of CPUs to
further entrench its monopoly.
It may be the case that because the probability of recoupment for
Intel is so great, that the court would choose to apply LePage’s standard
over Brooke Group, even though La Page’s is a Third Circuit decision.
The make-up of the CPU market is similar to the transparent tape market
in LePage’s in the sense that both markets are dominated by a
monopolist. If the LePage’s standard was applied to Intel, it is almost
certain that Intel would be found to have violated United States antitrust
law. Recall that under LePage’s, the monopolist would be liable if it
competed on any basis other than on the merits, regardless of above-or
below-cost pricing. A court would likely find that Intel’s conditional
rebate agreements were a form of competition not based on the merits.
Furthermore, under the LePage’s standard, there is no need to address
recoupment because in a monopoly, the monopolist inherently has
sufficient market power to recoup an investment in discount pricing.
2)

Pay-for-Delay, Naked Restraints

Had Intel entered into naked restraints with OEMs, or in other words,
paid to delay the release of computers using a rival’s CPU, the conduct
would likely be deemed unlawful per se, and the firm employing the payfor-delay strategy would not be given an opportunity to justify the
noncompetitive conduct. The relationship between Intel and the various
OEMs could be categorized as supplier and retailer. OEMs are retailers
because they readily sell to end-users even though they also distribute to
retail centers after they manufacture the computers. Thus, their
relationship is vertical.84 Intel supplies a major component to the OEMs,
who then manufacture the computers and sell them to end users.
Historically, vertical restrictions have been considered unlawful per
se in the United States.85 Even though in Continental T.V. v. GTE
Sylvania, the Supreme Court held that vertical restraints are no longer
illegal per se, but should be decided based on the rule of reason,86 the
83
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rule of reason standard was meant only to apply to vertical restraints that
are justifiable by the creation of efficiencies. Vertical restraints, such as
pay-for-delay agreements, are aimed at excluding a rival and devoid of
an efficiency justification.87 A firm that employs such restrictions has
“no purpose but to advantage its own product by impeding rivals.”88
Thus, such conduct would likely be found illegal per se under the
standard prior to Continental T.V.
Furthermore, though little case law on point exists because this type
of conduct is so extreme,89 in Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., the
defendant, Conwood, engaged in removing and destroying the sales
racks of a competing tobacco company in the retail stores wherein the
two companies competed for sales.90 The court found the exclusionary
conduct to be unlawful because it was “anticompetitive, lacked an
efficiency justification, and entrenched the monopolist[‘]s position.”91
An analogy can be drawn between the defendant’s conduct in Conwood
and Intel contracting with OEMs to delay or not sell AMD-based
computers. Similar to Conwood, there is no purpose behind Intel
delaying the launch of AMD-based computers except to advantage its
own product by impeding AMD and entrenching its monopolistic
position.92
Intel’s pay-for-delay agreements could also be held illegal under the
LePage’s standard. The holding in LePage’s is broad and prohibits all of
a monopoly’s competitive efforts made on a basis other than the merits.93
Paying a retailer to postpone the launch of a competitor’s product would
no doubt be considered competition on a basis other than on the merits.
Another relevant case is Aluminum Company of America
(“Alcoa”).94 Alcoa was a monopolist in the aluminum market, where it
paid electric companies to refuse to offer power to competing aluminum
producers.95 This was a true naked restraint because Alcoa paid money
solely for the agreement to withhold power from its competitors, and
nothing else. Alcoa paid to keep its competitor from producing
aluminum; Intel paid to keep its competitors’ product from leaving the
warehouse and entering the stream of commerce.
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See Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and
the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 463–64 (2006).
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Id. at 447.
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Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 227–28 (1986).
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Intel, however, could argue that it has an efficiency justification for
its conduct because it was actually in vertical relationships with each of
the retailers that it entered into the pay-for-delay agreements with. If
Intel can articulate an efficiency justification for contractually limiting its
retailer to delay the launch of a competing product, it might take the
restraint out of the naked restraint category. One efficiency justification
could be that the retailer would be able to apply more time and resources
toward selling and servicing Intel-based products. Although a stretch,
such an argument might make the restraint appear ancillary to an
otherwise efficiency-enhancing contract between a supplier and its
retailer.96 In comparison to Alcoa, Intel is certainly closer to its contract
partners than Alcoa was with most of the power companies with whom it
contracted. Ultimately however, Intel would be hard pressed to articulate
an efficiency justification that would be the natural consequence of any
OEM delaying the launch of AMD products that would hold up in
litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
If Intel’s European business practices were on trial in the federal
courts of the United States, the result would not be as certain as the
European Commission’s finding of violation. The European Union’s sole
standard for dominant firm behavior, Article 82, is a broad restriction
against the allowable conduct of businesses that control the majority of
the markets they compete in. Article 82 proscribes any conduct
undertaken by a dominant firm that deviates from normal competition
and results in stifling the growth of competition in the marketplace.97
European case law has established that conditional rebates are simply
incompatible with the objectives of undistorted competition.98
In the United States, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group
opened the door for analysis concerning whether Intel’s rebate system
would likely yield monopoly profits in the long run.99 Additionally,
Brooke Group considered the ultimate effect on consumers; if rebates
lower prices and are not likely to lead to supra-competitive pricing,
consumers benefit from the lower prices.100 Brooke Group also held that
96
Ancillary restraints are viewed quite differently from naked restraints. See United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 175 U.S. 211, 239–40 (1999).
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there is nothing anticompetitive about a rebate system that results in
above cost pricing.101 Punishing firms for reducing prices would likely
chill competition, the very behavior the antitrust laws are instituted to
protect.102 Under the Brooke Group framework, certain conduct would be
permitted that would not be permitted under European antitrust
jurisprudence. Whether Intel would be held liable under Brooke Group
would depend on the outcome of the below-cost-pricing and recoupment
tests.
The Court might choose not to even apply the defendant-friendly
Brooke Group standard and instead apply the more plaintiff-friendly
LePage’s standard. LePage’s appears to fit Intel’s situation very well and
establishes a different standard for how a monopolist is regulated in
rebate situations. If the court applies the LePage’s standard, then Intel
would most likely be found to have violated the antitrust laws concerning
the conditional rebates because LePage sets a lower hurdle for plaintiffs
to clear in order to show that rebate practices of a monopolist are
anticompetitive and injurious to consumers. However, Le Page’s is a
Third Circuit decision, and Brooke Group is a decision from the United
States Supreme Court; even though Brook Group was based on the
oligopolistic cigarette market, the decision did not explicitly limit itself
to oligopolies.
As for Intel’s naked exclusion, the pay-for-delay arrangements, the
conduct is almost certainly to be ruled illegal per se in American courts,
similar to the European Commission’s decision. Paying to delay the
launch of a competitor’s product is extreme behavior and violates the
principles of fair competition in both the Unites States and Europe.
Studying Intel’s conduct under the construct of two countries’
antitrust laws is a thread in the large tapestry of comparative law. The
countries satisfy their need to regulate commerce in very similar ways,
but with obvious dissimilarities as well. A narrow look at Intel’s conduct
reveals that the issue of conditional rebates is debatable under American
jurisprudence, but it is the equivalent of a per se violation under
European jurisprudence. The two countries are aligned in considering
extremely anticompetitive conduct such as naked restraints as violative
of competition laws. Analyzing Intel’s European business practices
under American antitrust jurisprudence reveals that America and Europe
have constructed their respective antitrust laws upon frameworks that
serve slightly differing goals.

101
102

Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 223.

70

